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AUTONOMY AND DISTRUST
GEOFFREY R. STONE*
Robert Post offers us two competing conceptions of the First
Amendment-the "autonomy" model and the "collectivist" model.
According to Post, it is the autonomy model that has dominated
the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The collec-
tivist model, now in vogue among academics, has played only a
minor role. Although I agree With the latter observation, I do not
agree with the former, at least not without some important qual-
ification.
Post's primary evidence for the claim that the Court has
favored the autonomy over the collectivist model is that the Court
historically has rejected government efforts to regulate speech in
order to improve the quality of public debate. Post is correct in
concluding that this shows that the Court is skeptical of collectiv-
ism. But the reason the Court has rejected such efforts is not
because it has embraced what he describes as the autonomy model.
It is, rather, because it has adopted a third model-a variation on
the pure autonomy model-that combines the concern with auton-
omy with a deep distrust of government efforts to regulate public
debate.
Like the autonomy and collectivist models, this third model,
which for lack of anything better I shall call the "autonomy/
distrust" model, also derives out of our concern with self-govern-
ment. But unlike the pure autonomy model, which places its
distinctive emphasis on the protection of individual liberty in order
to promote public debate, and unlike the collectivist model, which
places its distinctive emphasis on the authority of government to
regulate expression in order to promote "sound" public delibera-
tion, the autonomy/distrust model places its distinctive emphasis
on a combination of individual autonomy with a deep-seated dis-
trust of government efforts to regulate public debate.
As already noted, according to both Post and the collectivists,
the autonomy model has dominated the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence and has shaped what Owen Fiss has
* Harry Kalven, Jr. Professor of Law and Dean, The University of Chicago Law
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called our "Free Speech Tradition." Fiss describes the situation
as follows: Under our Free Speech Tradition, "the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment amounts to a protection
of autonomy-it is a shield around the speaker."' Under this view,
"autonomy is protected, not because of its intrinsic value, ...
but . . . as a means .. .of collective self-determination." 2 "The
Free Speech Tradition assumes that by leaving individuals alone
... a full and fair consideration of all the issues will emerge."
"The premise is that autonomy will lead to rich public debate."'
This may be an accurate statement of what someone means
by the autonomy model, but it is an inaccurate and inadequate
understanding of our First Amendment jurisprudence. If we were
to ask ourselves what First Amendment doctrine would have to
look like if the Court actually had embraced the pure autonomy
model, we would predict that the central issue in every case would
be whether the challenged law unduly limits the opportunities of
individuals for free expression. 4
This is not, however, our actual First Amendment doctrine.
To the contrary, current First Amendment doctrine is much richer
and more complex than the autonomy model would suggest. Con-
sider, for example, the content-based/content-neutral distinction,
which plays a central role in the Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence and which, as I shall explain, has nothing to do with
autonomy.
In general, and to vastly oversimplify, the Court gives its
highest scrutiny to viewpoint-based restrictions of speech, such as
a law providing that "no person may criticize the war"; it gives
something akin to intermediate scrutiny to subject-matter restric-
tions, such as a law providing that "no one may make political
speeches on a military base"; and, it employs a form of ad hoc
balancing to content-neutral restrictions, such as a law that restricts
leafleting in public buildings.'
1. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409-
10 (1986).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Indeed, those commentators who expressly favor a pure autonomy-based theory
of the First Amendment have made precisely this suggestion, arguing, for example, that
First Amendment doctrine, properly understood as premised on individual autonomy, should
focus exclusively on the extent to which the challenged law "reduces the sum total of
information or opinion disseminated." Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STA. L. REV. 113, 128 (1981).
5. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
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Although the Court's analysis of content-neutral restrictions
focuses largely on the protection of autonomy, 6 its analysis of
content-based restrictions derives in large part from the Court's
quite distinct concerns with impermissible government motivation
and distortion of public debate.
As the Court has long recognized, it is a central precept of
our First Amendment jurisprudence that government may not
restrict the expression of an idea merely because it disapproves of
the idea and fears that citizens may unwisely adopt it in the course
of political debate. This precept drives much of our free speech
doctrine and lies at the very heart of the content-based/content-
neutral distinction.
This is so because even when government offers an explanation
for restricting speech other than its mere disapproval of the idea
expressed, for example-"listeners may be persuaded to act unlaw-
fully if they hear the speech"-there is always the risk that this
explanation is a mere pretext and that the government's real mo-
tivation is to suppress the offending point of view. The content-
based/content-neutral distinction tracks this concern, for view-
point-based restrictions are most likely to be the product of such
motivations, content-neutral restrictions are least likely to be the
product of such motivations, and subject-matter restrictions fall
somewhere in between.
The concern over distortion of public debate works in much
the same manner. That is, one factor the Court considers in
evaluating the constitutionality of particular restrictions on speech
is the extent to which the restriction not only limits the opportu-
nities for free expression, but does so in a content-differential
manner so as to alter what would be the distribution of views
without the restriction.
I want to emphasize that the Court's concern here is not with
preserving some ideal distribution of views that perfectly captures
what we might think to be "quality" public debate. Rather, the
baseline that is sought to be preserved is the actual distribution of
views that exists in the real world, and that is not the product of
intentional government intervention. The reason for this concern
is not a naive belief that this actual distribution is necessarily ideal
but, rather, a distrust of government efforts that have the purpose
or effect of altering that distribution. 7
6. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 46
(1987).
7. The concern, in other words, is that whatever problems may exist in the distri-
1993] 1173
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Like the concern with impermissible government motivation,
the concern with distortion of public debate helps drive the Court's
content-based/content-neutral distinction, for viewpoint-based res-
trictions are most likely to distort public debate in this manner,
content-neutral restrictions are least likely to distort public debate
in this manner, and subject matter restrictions fall somewhere in
between.'
Now, the key point in all of this is that none of it is responsive
to the pure autonomy model of the First Amendment. It is the
Court's concern, both implicitly and explicitly, with impermissible
motivation and distortion of public debate that belies the claim
that we can sensibly understand our Free Speech Tradition in terms
of the pure autonomy model; for whatever doctrines such an
approach would yield, they surely would look nothing like our
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence.
Why does any of this matter? Well, suppose our Free Speech
Tradition really was premised on the pure autonomy model. We
know, of course, that under that Tradition the right of the indi-
vidual to speak is not absolute. To the contrary, individual auton-
omy may be restricted in order to further a broad range of
competing government interests. In appropriate circumstances, for
example, speech may be limited because it is too noisy, or too
disruptive, or too dangerous.
Under a pure autonomy model, one would simply weigh the
extent to which any particular restriction of speech limits the
opportunities for free expression against such competing govern-
ment interests. Against such a background, the collectivist claim
might seem quite sensible. After all, if we can legitimately restrict
speech to promote quiet and order, surely we can restrict it to
promote quality public debate as well.
What this masks, however, is the direct conflict between the
collectivist agenda and the Court's traditional-and in my view
healthy-distrust of government efforts to regulate public debate.
Even though collectivism may seem to be merely one more reason
for regulating speech when we understand First Amendment doc-
trine entirely in terms of autonomy, it looks quite different when
we see it through the lens of distrust. It is for this reason that we
bution of views in public debate structured without intentional government intervention,
the situation is only likely to be made worse by such intervention because of the incentives
and motives that are likely to distort government action in this realm.
8. See generally Stone, supra note 3, for a more comprehensive discussion of this
issue.
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must understand the central role that distrust, as well as autonomy,
plays in our Free Speech Tradition.
All of this, of course, is quite abstract. I will therefore trace
through a few simple, but concrete hypotheticals to illustrate the
interaction of autonomy and distrust in existing doctrine and to
show how that doctrine responds to at least a few of the collectivist
proposals.
The first thing we should note about the autonomy/distrust
model is that it does not reject as necessarily illegitimate all gov-
ernmental efforts to improve pubic debate. Consider, for example,
a law requiring all shopping center owners to permit individuals
to distribute leaflets on the premises of the shopping center. The
purpose of the law is to expand the opportunities for free expres-
sion and, thus, to enhance the quality of public deliberation. Under
the prevailing autonomy/distrust model, this would be seen as a
perfectly legitimate governmental interest and, as we know from
the Court's decision in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,9
such a law would be sustained. Similarly, a law granting every
taxpayer a $1,000 tax credit, to be used by the taxpayer to support
political candidates of her choice, also would be upheld. These
laws are acceptable because they are content-neutral, thus reducing
the concerns with impermissible motivation and distortion, and
because they are subsidies that do not directly limit any individual's
autonomy.
At the other extreme, consider a state law that prohibits
Democrats from spending more than $1 million in their campaigns
for Congress, but does not place a similar limit on Republicans,
because, in the view of the state legislature, there already are "too
many Democrats in Congress." Or, to take an even more extreme
example, consider a law prohibiting anyone to advocate the repeal
of the federal antidiscrimination laws because such repeal would
be a "terrible" idea and public debate would be "better" without
it. Both of these laws clearly would be invalid under existing
doctrine, for they significantly restrict autonomy in an explicitly
viewpoint-based manner.
Between these extremes is a vast gray area. Consider, for
example, a law granting $20 million to the Democratic Party
because it was outspent by that amount in the last election by the
Republicans, or a policy of the National Endowment for the Arts
that refuses to support art that promotes feminism. Although
9. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
11751993]
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neither of these laws involves a direct restriction on anyone's
autonomy, both clearly would be invalid under existing doctrine,
because they are explicitly viewpoint-based.
Another variation, presenting somewhat different issues, would
be a law prohibiting any person to spend more than $1,000 per
year in support of any candidate for President. Although the
collectivists probably would uphold this, we know from Buckley
v. Valeo 10 that such a law is invalid under the prevailing auton-
omy/distrust model. The reason for this conclusion is not, how-
ever, obvious.
Because the law is content-neutral, it does not appear to trigger
core First Amendment concerns about impermissible motivation or
distortion of public debate. On the other hand, if one sees this as
a severely restrictive limitation on individual autonomy, because it
sharply limits an important opportunity for participation in public
debate, a high standard of justification might make sense under
the Court's ad hoc balancing approach to content-neutral restric-
tions, thus justifying the decision to invalidate the law.
In Buckley itself, however, the Court did not rely exclusively
on this reasoning. Rather, the Court announced that "the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some [in] order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."'" It is unclear precisely why the Court thought this
an "impermissible" government purpose. The Court's concern
presumably derives from the view that we simply cannot trust
government to control public debate for such reasons, even if the
law is technically content-neutral.
To complicate matters further, consider a law granting a tax
credit of up to $1,000 each year to each taxpayer, to be used
exclusively to support political candidates of the taxpayer's choice,
where the amount of the credit decreases as the income of the
taxpayer goes up. The idea, again, is to equalize the opportunities
for effective political participation and, thus, to enhance the quality
of public debate. The collectivists would no doubt look kindly on
such a law.
It is more complex, however, under the prevailing approach.
From the standpoint of distrust, it is hard to see why this law is
any more acceptable than the one I just discussed. On the other
hand, because this can easily be seen as a subsidy rather than a
10. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
11. Id. at 48-49.
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restriction, the Court might conclude that this law does not un-
dermine individual autonomy. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the
Court in Buckley said that it is impermissible for the government
to "restrict the speech of some [in] order to enhance the relative
voice of others." Is the purpose of "equalization" therefore per-
missible if the government subsidizes rather than "restricts" speech
in order to achieve its goal? If so, existing law leaves significant
room to achieve at least some of the collectivist objectives, although
the route to get there may be a good deal less direct.
I would like to conclude with two very brief observations.
First, one of the interesting puzzles posed at least implicitly in
Robert Post's paper is whether it is possible to reconcile Meikle-
john's Town Meeting, with all of its managerial regulation of
speech, with the relatively unregulated public debate called for in
the autonomy/distrust model. If we allow rigid regulation in a
Town Meeting, why not in public debate as well?
Consider, for example, a law that prohibits any person to
spend more than $1,000 in support of any candidate for President.
This may be seen as roughly analogous to a rule in a Town
Meeting that prohibits any person to speak for more than ten
minutes. The Town Meeting rule is permissible; the expenditure
limitation is not.
Interestingly, the explanation cannot be found in considera-
tions of either autonomy or distrust, for the effects on individual
autonomy in the two cases are quite similar, and thered is no more
reason to distrust the members of Congress than there is to distrust
the managers of the Town Meeting insofar as they seek to promote
quality public debate. Thus, if managerial regulation is permissible
in Meiklejohn's Town Meeting, why shouldn't it be permissible in
public debate as well?
The answer, I think, lies in the issue of scarcity. In a Town
Meeting there is a need for rules to govern the order or number
of speakers on each issue and the time each person may speak
because of the constraints of time and space. One simply could
not have a Town Meeting in which every person is permitted to
say whatever she wants for however long she wants if the meeting
is to last only a reasonable time. In public debate, however, there
are no similar constraints. As a practical matter, time is essentially
unlimited and there is no need for analogous regulation that would
limit each side, for example, to ten minutes-or $1,000-each.
On this view, the regulation that exists in the Town Meeting
is not an ideal or an aspiration. It is, rather, a necessary evil. And
19931 1177
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for this reason, Meiklejohn's Town Meeting may be a dangerous,
rather than a helpful, analogy for public debate. Indeed, it is
interesting, and perhaps even revealing, that the one decision in
which the Court has expressly embraced the collectivist view is
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,12 and it did so, of course,
precisely on the ground of scarcity.13
My final point concerns Post's own, reconceived theory of
autonomy in response to the collectivist challenge. Post's innovative
approach is theoretically interesting and perhaps even conceptually
sound. In the end, however, I find it-as a practical matter-
unhelpful. It is simply too abstract and too theoretical to withstand
the assault of the collectivists. We will do better to reaffirm our
traditional distrust of government regulation of public debate as
the bedrock on which we rest our response.
12. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
13. This suggests that if government is ever to regulate public debate by analogy to
the Town Meeting, there must be a showing of "necessity" similar to that which exists in
the context of the Town Meeting. Of course, there are such circumstances. This is so, for
example, in the judicial process, in legislative proceedings, and so on. Such circumstances
do not generally exist, however, in ordinary public debate.
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